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Abstract: 
This paper considers an oft-criticised passage of John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women, arguing that Mill’s position 
is misunderstood.  In this passage, Mill identifies a trilemma facing women in non-ideal circumstances.  Two elements 
of this can be satisfied, but not all three, so long as men continue to refuse to perform their domestic responsibilities.  
In these non-ideal circumstances, Mill privileges justice over autonomy – women ought only to be asked to do their 
fair share of labour, which, if they chose to marry and have children, will mean it is unfair to ask them also to work 
full-time outside the home.  
 
John Stuart Mill is generally recognised as one of the earliest feminists, and his The Subjection of 
Women as a foundational feminist text.2  However, flaws have been found in Subjection – and in 
Mill’s earlier essay, On Marriage – which, it is argued, compromise his feminism.  This is because 
passages in these texts – for instance where Mill says ‘when a woman marries… she makes choice 
of the management of a household, and the bringing up of a family, as the first call upon her 
exertions’3 – mean he endorsed (as any good feminist ought not) the traditional, gendered division 
of labour, and its attendant, gendered, views of women’s ‘nature’ and proper social, economic and 
political roles based.4   
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In this article I present some defences of Mill’s feminism, most importantly by offering an 
alternative interpretation of the passages in question.  This reads Mill as presenting a radical and 
sophisticated analysis of what the ‘best’ outcome would be for women in terms of distributive 
justice in certain specific non-ideal circumstances.  That is, in circumstances in which men refuse 
to either recognise or perform their joint-responsibilities for child-care and domestic labour, even 
when women have been accorded equal formal political, social and economic rights.   
According to this interpretation, Mill recognises that our very existence necessitates a certain 
amount of labour, which has to be borne by someone in society5; that some of that labour is 
necessarily ‘domestic’6; and that, currently, the brunt of this labour falls on women7.  In doing this, 
Mill interestingly interrogates the public/private dichotomy in two ways.  Firstly by recognising 
that ‘private’ labour (in the home) is vital for the continued ‘public’ existence not just of individuals 
but of the political community.  Secondly, by arguing that justice also applies within the domestic 
sphere, such that domestic labour and child-rearing count as a part of the ‘fair’ contribution to 
society’s and individual existence which women can rightfully be asked to make.  Because he thinks 
this, Mill also argues that when women are asked to work full-time outside the home and also 
inside it, doing all the domestic labour, they are being exploited8, a position with clear and 
interesting links to contemporary feminist concerns about women working ‘a double day’9.  All of 
these are radical claims, for which Mill ought to be recognised. 
In the passages in question, I argue that we see Mill identifying a trilemma arising from these 
non-normative facts about socially-necessary labour within this set of non-ideal circumstances.  
This trilemma arises with respect to the realisation of three ideals (children’s needs being met; 
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women only doing their fair share of labour; women working full-time outside the home) such 
that satisfaction of any two implies the non-satisfaction of the third.  Mill proposes a particular 
way of resolving the trilemma (meeting children’s needs, and women only doing their fair share of 
labour) which, although controversial, is not obviously mistaken.  Moreover, the three ideals that 
form the trilemma – and his preferred solution – reveal Mill to be have interesting and important 
egalitarian commitments in his feminism (and wider work).  
Contrary to the received view of Subjection and Marriage, which sees Mill as endorsing the 
‘traditional’ gendered division of labour and gender-relations, even in ideal circumstances, I argue 
that Mill’s recognition of the social necessity and importance of domestic labour, alongside his 
deeply-held commitments to distributive justice and fairness in shouldering the necessary (social) 
burdens of (communal) life, should be highlighted.  Thus, Mill’s position is revealed to be more 
revolutionary, more interesting, and safer from critique than is often supposed.  
1. The Case against Mill 
The passages that attract most criticism from feminists are these.  From Subjection:  
‘[T]he common arrangement, by which the man earns the income and the wife superintends the 
domestic expenditure…[is] in general the most suitable division of labour between the two 
persons’.10 
‘In an otherwise just state of things, it is not...a desirable custom, that the wife should contribute by 
her labour to the income of the family’.11  
‘Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be 
understood that she makes choice of the management of a household, and the bringing up of a 
family, as the first call upon her exertions, during as many years of her life as may be required for 
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the purpose: and that she renounces, not all other objects and occupations, but all which are not 
consistent with the requirements of this.’12   
And from Marriage:  
‘It does not follow that a woman should actually support herself because she should be capable of 
doing so: in the natural course of events she will not’.13 
‘It is not desirable to burthen the labour market with a double number of competitors.’14 
‘In a healthy state of things, the husband would be able by his single exertions to earn all that is 
necessary for both’.15 
‘There would be no need that the wife should take part in the mere providing of what is required to 
support life: It will be for the happiness of both that her occupation should rather be to adorn and 
beautify it[,]…[e]xcept in the class of actual day-labourers, that will be her natural task.’16 
‘The education which it…belongs to mothers to give…is the training of the affections: and through 
the affections, of the conscience, and the whole moral being…[t]hese things cannot be done by a 
hired teacher: and they are better and greater, than all the rest…  [T]o impose upon mothers what 
hired teachers can do, is mere squandering of the glorious existence of a woman fit for woman’s 
highest destiny’.17  
 
These passages have given rise to the following families of criticisms regarding Mill’s view 
of an ‘ideal’ society, and therefore of his feminism.  Firstly, regarding his attitude towards marriage 
and (the gendered division of) domestic labour: that, even in ‘an otherwise just state of things’ 
(married) women should stay at home and ‘keep house’, choosing as their ‘career’ (responsibility 
for) doing all the domestic labour and child-rearing, whilst their husbands work outside the home, 
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and earn a wage sufficient for the support of the whole family18.  Thus, that Mill endorsed as 
‘natural’19 and just20 (and justly enforced by custom21) the ‘bourgeois’22 family with its traditional, 
gendered division of labour, and even went so far as to support the ‘back-to-the-home’ 
movement23.  That Mill thought all (or at least most) women would24, or would prefer25 or want26 
to, marry.  That Mill wanted to bar almost all women from the labour market.27  That he held it 
not only permissible but just not to pay women as much as men, even if they do go out to work28 
(and it would be better if they did not, because of the depressing impact of ‘flooding’ the labour-
market with female labour29).  That, therefore, Mill left women vulnerable to unequal power 
relations.30   
Secondly, regarding his views on motherhood and parenting: that Mill thought mothers 
are the best early-educators, and are somehow either perhaps naturally best-fit31 or otherwise best-
suited32 to domestic labour and, particularly, child-rearing.  That he still believed there was 
something we could say about women’s ‘natures’.33  That Mill equated parenthood with 
motherhood.34  That Mill ought to have been more ‘progressive’ and ‘creative’35 in his ‘timid’36 
proposals for reform; in particular, that he should have advocated men taking an equal role in 
parenting and domestic labour.37   
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19 Okin, Women, pp.226-8; Okin, Justice, pp.20-21; Hughes, ‘Reality’, p.531. 
20 Shanley, ‘Slavery’, pp.240-41. 
21 Goldstein, ‘Liberation’, pp.325-6. 
22 Okin, Women, pp.226-8. 
23 Hughes, ‘Reality’, p.533. 
24 Okin, Justice, p.227.  
25 Goldstein, ‘Liberation’, p.327. 
26 Annas, ‘Subjection’, p.189.  
27 Hughes, ‘Reality’, p.533. 
28 Ibid., p.540. 
29 Ibid., p.533.  
30 Ibid., p.532. 
31 Okin, Women, pp.226-28; Okin, Justice, pp.20-21; Hughes, ‘Reality’, p.531. 
32 Okin, Women, p.227. 
33 Ibid., pp.226-28; Okin, Justice, pp.20-21; Hughes, ‘Reality’, p.531. 
34 Okin, Women, p.236; Shanley, ‘Slavery’, p.242.  
35 Hughes, ‘Reality’, pp.531-2. 
36 Annas, ‘Subjection’, p. 189. 
37 Hughes, ‘Reality’, p.533. 
Thirdly, regarding the connection between his liberalism and his feminism, that, though 
he might have allowed some ‘exceptional’ women access to the labour market, and a free-pass on 
doing domestic labour, this is both unfair and illiberal, as he affords that liberty to ‘even the most 
mediocre of men’.38  Thus, that he betrays his liberal principles, thereby undermining the very 
foundation of his feminism, which (it is argued) is based on the idea that both genders have a right 
to equal liberty.39   
2. An Initial Assessment of the Case against Mill.  
As it stands, it is a fairly damning case against Mill.  Is it not, however, a proven one.  There is not 
the space to go into detail regarding specifics here, but six main lines of defence can be sketched 
out against these criticisms as they currently stand (two pre-existing, and four new).   
 Firstly (which is the line adopted by Feaver, Urbinati and, to some extent, Okin40), what 
might be called an ‘historical’ defence: that we ought not to expect Mill’s to be a ‘perfect’ feminism 
given a) that many modern changes (to the family and women’s roles in society) would have been 
unimaginable to anyone in his period, and b) the extent to which a-hundred-and-fifty-years of 
further female experience have developed feminist thinking.   
 Secondly, what we might call the ‘charitable’ defence: that even if there are flaws in Mill’s 
feminism, we ought not to overlook his important contribution not just to feminist theory but to 
the practical, political achievement of female emancipation.  For instance, Mill campaigned for 
female suffrage (introducing, when an MP, the amendment to the 1868 Reform Act which, if 
passed, would have given women the vote on equal terms with men); other important rights for 
women (including to divorce and to own property); equal educational opportunities; and access to 
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the professions.  In addition, he fought against domestic violence and unfair discrimination against 
women.   
There is something to be said for both these pre-existing defences, but four stronger ones 
can also be made, as I will now show.  As I have argued elsewhere41 many of the criticisms levelled 
at both Subjection and Marriage rely on an uncharitable, and indeed mis- or partial-reading of the 
text.42  In-particular, Mill is not speaking of all women, and his suggestions would not bar all 
married women, or even all married mothers, from the work-place at all times in their lives.43  
Instead, we should see Mill as doing two things.  One, recognising that motherhood generates 
certain practical barriers to working full-time outside the home (something which, after all, any 
modern supporter of maternity and paternity leave also recognises without necessarily being a ‘bad’ 
feminist).  Two, suggesting that those women who do marry take on prima facie responsibilities for 
seeing domestic labour done.  These are responsibilities they might discharge themselves, or pay 
someone else to do out of income they earn themselves.   
Of course, this is, in itself, not perfect feminism (why should this duty fall on women and 
not on men, or on both genders equally?) and Mill would still be liable for some criticism.  Moreover, 
we might also engage in a form of the existing criticism that Mill leaves women open to unequal 
power relations, because if women are not working full-time outside the home, then they are liable 
to be working in less-secure, less-prestigious, less-well-remunerated jobs, where they might be 
vulnerable to unequal power relations (whether or not they were also vulnerable to them inside the 
home).  However, even if this is Mill’s ideal conception of gender-relations and the division of 
labour between the sexes, his position is not as bad as is often claimed.  
A fourth line of defence would be that, several of these criticisms (particularly from the 
second ‘family’ sketched above regarding Mill’s views on motherhood and women’s ‘natures’) are 
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based on an un-justified extension of what Mill says in Marriage to his feminism overall.  This is 
despite evident changes in Mill’s position from Marriage in Principles of Political Economy on the 
benefits to women of working outside the home, and Subjection on the impermissibility of basing 
arguments about women’s social and political roles on some notion of their ‘nature’.44  Though 
some elements of Mill’s position in Marriage remained in his mature works, we ought to be cautious 
of using the oft-criticised passages from Marriage to identify apparent hidden misogyny in his later 
works such as Subjection.  In-particular, we ought to recognise the influence of Romanticism on 
Mill at the time, which later dropped away, particularly in Mill’s use of words such as ‘beautifying 
life’.45  By this Mill means something rather different to what we might assume, as can be seen by 
his utilisation of the category of ‘the aesthetic’ as an element of the ‘good’ in Bentham and System of 
Logic.46  It has much more in common with freely developing ones individuality than with, for 
instance, physical attractiveness; and his classic example of ‘the beautiful’, is the nobility of the 
Elder Brutus (who executed his sons when they tried to overthrow the fledgling Roman 
Republic).47  In addition, we ought to bear in mind the implications of the context of Marriage 
being not a public, published piece on feminism, but a love-letter (and perhaps even an enticement 
to elopement).48 
Fifthly, we ought to take more cognisance of the political and persuasive context of 
Subjection: some criticisms simply demand too much of this text, which has a specific political goal 
in mind and is not intended as a complete expression of Mill’s feminism.  Subjection was published 
as a contribution to the debate concerning the extension of the franchise in 1868.  It is aimed at 
persuading the men who currently hold power to share that power with women.  It would not do 
to alienate the audience of the text too much, as that handful of more-radical writers with proposals 
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for female equality and the radical restructuring of the family had done.49  Given that we know 
Mill took very seriously the timing of publications and his mode of addressing his target audience 
in order to achieve maximal positive impact50, and given what a struggle it was in fact to persuade 
men to give women political rights, we ought to see that these considerations may well trammel 
Mill’s radicalism in Subjection.   
Between them, these five briefly-sketched defences of Mill go a long way to defending Mill 
from the criticisms previously levelled at these specified passages in Subjection and Marriage.  There 
is a further possible defence, however, on which I wish to concentrate in the rest of this article, 
which renders the previous criticisms in an important way irrelevant or lacking in real bite.  The 
main critical force of all these previous objections is that Mill’s ideal of gender-relations and the 
gendered division of labour, as evidenced in Subjection, falls short in some important way – a 
contention which is backed-up by showing that Mill’s position in Marriage is also problematic.  I 
have just noted that we ought not to see the problematic passages in Marriage as having this 
relationship to Subjection, but accept that Mill changed his position in several important respects 
during the period between the two texts.  The additional step towards a further line of defence is 
to interrogate the supposition that, even when he uses the phrase ‘an otherwise just state of things’, 
Mill is expressing his view of a most-ideal society.   
I have already hinted that Mill may not be discussing really ‘ideal’ gender-relations in 
Subjection for politically-expedient reasons.  But even just considering the criticised-content of 
Subjection itself, it is clear that Mill is not talking about really-ideal gender-relations or divisions of 
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labour.  Instead, he is contemplating what would be the best-approximation of justice in non-ideal 
circumstances which, though an improvement on contemporary society, would still not be fully-
just.  In this case, then, the claim that Mill’s feminism does not go far enough for a really just society 
fall away, for he is concerned with non-ideal, not ideal, circumstances.  Similarly, the assertion that 
his illiberality undermines his whole feminist argument also loses its critical force, for his feminism 
is evidently not only based on liberal principles, but on claims of justice.  It is with this defence that 
I will be concerned in the rest of this article.  
 
3. Reconsidering Mill’s ‘Ideal’ View of the Gendered Division of 
Labour.  
I suggest that we should see Mill – in Subjection – as considering what would be the best set-up 
regarding domestic labour and child-rearing in a specific set of non-ideal circumstances.  Mill 
identifies a trilemma facing women, even if they are granted equal rights, if men refuse to take on 
responsibilities for domestic labour and child-rearing.  To this trilemma, he suggests an egalitarian 
rather than liberal solution.  We may disagree with his solution, but we ought to recognise that this 
is what he is doing.  Moreover, the very fact of his choice reveals interesting egalitarian foundations 
to his thought which are often overlooked.  
3.1 Different Conceptualisations of the Ideal.  
We can usefully think of ‘ideal thinking’ having in view three different kinds of ‘ideal’: best 
imaginable, best-feasible, and best-accessible.51  Which one a writer has in mind makes an 
important difference to how we ought to assess their thought.  
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Best-imaginable refers to ‘ideal’ societies or states of affairs as ‘that which nothing better can 
be conceived’.  Perhaps this is generally what we assume people to be doing when writing utopias 
(though it is not always the case that they are).  If Mill was using the phrase ‘in an otherwise just 
state of things’ to refer to a best-imaginable state of affairs, then there would be some good 
grounds for criticising his feminism (though, still, not as many as prior critics have made out).  But, 
as noted above, I do not think we are warranted in seeing Subjection as being an essay in this form 
of ideal thinking.   
Best-feasible means a vision of the best-possible society which conforms to certain 
‘feasibility’ constraints which might limit what is possible, for instance regarding the laws of physics 
or apparently-necessary truths about human nature.  However, as part of the vision of this best-
feasible society, some of the limitations imposed by these apparent laws might have been overcome 
(for instance, by warp-speed).  Alternatively, particularly in the case of ‘laws’ of human psychology 
or ‘facts’ about human nature, the rules themselves might have been shown to be mutable, untrue 
or surmountable (for instance through (re-)education or (re-)socialisation).  Best-feasible worlds, 
then, are possible, but they may be a very long way away.  Indeed, they may be practically impossible 
to institute at all, either for structural reasons or because of motivational failure.  (That is, one 
might think anarchism not only the best-imaginable state of human affairs, but also the best-
feasible, but not achievable because of the entrenched fact of state-structures, capitalism and a lack 
of motivation and belief on the part of ordinary citizens that anarchism is desirable, achievable or 
worth the risk of revolutionary action.)  If Mill meant this kind of ‘ideal’ in Subjection, he might still 
be open to some objections (more than he supposes is, in fact, feasible).  But already, claims that 
he was contemplating best-imaginable gender-relations would have lost much of their critical bite.  
Best-accessible describes an ‘ideal’ society which is more than just feasible: it is reachable 
through really-achievable changes to structures and institutions, and perhaps also to culture, 
custom and attitudes (though, again, these may not be achieved, because of motivational failure).  
That is, best-accessible societies are the most-desirable attainable states of affairs.52  If this is what 
Mill has in mind, then we might still criticise him for ‘timidity’ in his conceptualisation of the most-
desirable attainable state of affairs, given what others in his period thought.53  But this might be a 
little churlish.  After all, even the reforms which Mill did think were attainable in his own life time 
proved not to be in reality – for instance, women were not granted the suffrage on any terms until 
1918 and not on equal terms until 1928.  That is, whether Mill was too-timid depends not just on 
whether the content of what he thought the most-desirable attainable state of affairs was really 
desirable, but on his assessment of what was attainable.  We might think Mill was too pessimistic in 
his assessment of what political change really was possible – but, in actual fact, he was too 
optimistic.  Moreover, it is not clear that one’s assessment of what improved states of affairs are 
achievable has much bearing on one’s feminist credentials.  Though someone who thought female 
oppression, though undesirable, was an unchangeable state of things in any achievable world so 
women should just ‘put up and shut up’ wouldn’t be a great feminist, it is the ‘put up and shut up’ 
element which undermines their feminism, not their pessimistic assessment of the possibilities of 
change.     
Mill has been taken by his critics to mean ‘best-imaginable’ when he says ‘in an otherwise 
just state of things…’.  But this reading ought to be challenged.  It seems much more plausible to 
see Mill as describing a ‘best-accessible’ state of affairs where women will have been granted equal 
political, social, economic and legal rights.  In this improved state of things the injustice of women’s 
current position as (as Mill sees it) slaves would have been overcome.  However, this does not 
mean that all the problems facing women would have been resolved.  In-particular, though such 
an agreement to power-sharing would involve a certain change of attitude on men’s part, it would 
not necessarily mean that men had changed their attitudes towards their responsibilities regarding 
child-care and domestic labour.  Thus, women, even in much-more-just-than-contemporary 
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circumstances would be faced with a trilemma, and it is this trilemma that Mill is considering in 
the problematic passages of Subjection.  It is to a closer examination of this idea that I now turn.  
3.2 A Trilemma Facing Women in Non-Ideal Circumstances. 
This trilemma comes about because of the following three non-normative facts:  
i) The human condition means people (will always) generate a certain amount of 
necessary labour by their mere existence (some domestic, some not).   
ii) Children are not in a position to do this necessary labour for themselves.  
iii) It is a fact of contemporary society that (most if not all) men refuse to perform 
domestic and child-rearing labour.   
The trilemma is generated by the additional normative claims: 
iv) Parents have a duty to look after their children, and meet their physical, 
psychological and emotional needs.54   
v) People ought – but also ought only – to do their ‘fair’ share of labour.55  
 Given these facts/claims, there is a trilemma between the following:  
1) Children’s needs being met. 
2) Women only doing a fair share of labour. 
3) Women working full-time outside the home.   
If the non-normative facts are taken as given, particularly the unwillingness of men to perform 
child-rearing/domestic labour, satisfaction of any two desiderata rule out satisfaction of the other 
one.  That is, women cannot meet children’s needs and work full-time outside the home whilst 
(only) doing a fair share of labour.  If they do (only) a fair share of labour and meet children’s 
needs, they cannot work full-time outside of the home.  If they only do a fair share of labour, but 
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do it by working full-time outside the home, then children’s needs will not be met (because men 
refuse to meet them).  
 Obviously, this trilemma holds in Mill’s contemporary society.  Working-class women are 
expected to do all the domestic labour and also generally need to work full-time outside the home 
in order to contribute to household income, raising it (hopefully) to a level at which children’s 
needs can in-fact be met.  But this (option 1+3) means they are being exploited.56  Middle- and 
upper-class women find it harder to access the workplace, in part because of legal restrictions on 
what jobs they can do (e.g. barring them from the professions), and partly because of social mores 
which see it as a mark of their class-membership and respectability that they do not work outside 
the home.  They, then, are forced into opting for 1+2.57   
 What is important is that this trilemma would still hold in a society which had accorded 
women equal political, legal and economic rights, and where women were not forced into marriage 
as their only means of security and respectability, so long as it remained true that men refused to 
take on domestic/child-rearing responsibilities.  (As, in fact, history has shown that it generally 
does.)  That is, it would still hold in ‘an otherwise just’ society, where by ‘just’ we mean ‘where 
there is formal equality between the sexes, and women are not denied vital rights’.  This would be 
a much more just society than Mill’s contemporary one.  But that does not need to mean it would 
be the best society imaginable.   
 Evidently, Mill thought that such a society was both better than his own, and accessible 
from it.  What was needed to achieve it was a change in the law, and a change in men’s attitudes 
towards women, and in women’s attitudes towards themselves and their ‘proper’ social roles – all 
things he campaigned to see achieved in his own lifetime.  But it seems unlikely that he thought 
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such a society would be best-imaginable, given that in Principles he says that fully-equal female 
participation in workers-cooperatives would be ‘the closest approximation to social justice it is 
currently possible to foresee’58, and that in his Autobiography he says he looked forward to a time 
when the distribution of the product of labour would be according to publicly-determined 
principles of justice and not, as was currently the case, according to ‘accidents of birth’ – of which 
sex and gender are obvious examples.59   
Of course, we might think that these were not obvious examples to Mill – perhaps he only 
had in mind ‘accidents of birth’ to do with (inherited) class and wealth.  But this is not obviously 
a plausible reading of Mill’s position, given his recognition of the social-construction of gender60; 
his assessment of how much gender-assumptions and views on both sex and gender ‘subjected’ 
women61; and his dismissal of all arguments that women were biologically inferior to men.62  
3.3 Mill’s Preferred Solution to this Trilemma. 
Mill’s preferred solution to the trilemma, where the latter exists, is options 1+2.  That is, faced 
with these normative and non-normative facts, he prefers that the necessary domestic labour is 
done – and particularly, that children’s needs are met – and that women only do their fair share of 
labour, rather than that women are exploited.  Given that men refuse to take on responsibility for 
domestic labour, this falls on women’s shoulders when they marry.  This means women ought not 
to be expected to work full-time outside the home.   
Importantly, however, it does not mean they ought not to work part-time, either from the 
home, or outside it.  And if there are no young children involved, then it does not preclude women 
working outside the home almost full-time, apart from what time it takes them to ‘superintend’ 
the domestic work done by others – others who, of course, women can pay out of their own 
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earnings, given their equal access to education and the labour-market.  What is more, it does not 
preclude any women from opting for options 1+3 if they preferred it or if circumstances 
necessitated it.  Again, it cannot be emphasised too much that Mill was only suggesting this as a 
better solution – in terms of justice – than exploiting women by demanding that they work full-
time outside the home and do all the domestic labour.  He specifically argues against laws enforcing 
this solution, and clearly advocates both the exercise of individual choice within couples as to how 
to best negotiate this trilemma, and by women themselves, depending on their ‘suitabilities’.63   
 This solution to the trilemma privileges justice over autonomy.  That is, women only do 
their fair share, but this means their options are (morally, though not legally) partially limited by a 
prima facie duty to ensure domestic labour and child-rearing are properly done (which, as just noted, 
it is not impossible to circumvent so long as women ensure that someone performs the necessary 
labour).  Mill prefers that this labour happens in a non-exploitative fashion, which necessitates 
most married women with small children not working full-time  Thus, we might say that justice 
would here constrain autonomy, but not (formal) liberty.  That is, women would remain legally 
free to choose what solution to the trilemma they pleased, but what it is morally permissible for 
them to do would be constrained by a prima facie obligation to ensure children’s needs were met 
(and other domestic labour done) by someone.  
 We may disagree with Mill’s choice, preferring that, in the same non-ideal circumstances, 
children’s needs are met and that women work full-time, though this will necessitate their 
exploitation, because we give greater weight to autonomy than to justice.  But it is not obviously 
right to prefer increased autonomy which necessarily leads to exploitation over justice which 
partially limits autonomy.   
Moreover, it is not obviously even permissible to choose 2+3 (that is, women only doing 
their fair share through working full-time outside the home, with children’s needs not being met), 
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because there does seem to be an important duty to meet children’s needs (and do the other 
necessary labour caused by human existence).  Of course, 2+3 is a viable option once the non-
normative fact of men refusing to take responsibility for domestic labour and child-care no longer 
holds.  But then there would simply be no trilemma at all.  And in that case, any choice between 
options becomes moot.   
As noted above, Mill has been criticised for not advocating this way out of the trilemma.  
However, three things should be noted.  Firstly, as mentioned above, there are several good 
contextual reasons for thinking we ought not to expect him to have done so in an essay trying to 
persuade men to give up their power (an important part of which might be trying to reassure them 
that nothing would change too-seriously, except that they would now be acting more morally and 
more in-keeping with their own self-professed values regarding (anti-)slavery and the Christian 
ideal of marriage as a loving partnership).  Secondly, though Mill does not directly endorse men 
taking a fairer share of domestic duties, he nowhere directly speaks against it, and he does endorse 
both as ideals of justice and in terms of practical experimentation and institution the ideas of 
socialists who advocated abolishing the gendered division of labour.64  Thirdly, in his more-explicit 
discussions of what he calls ‘the nearest approach to social justice’65, it would appear that men 
might have taken on more-equal roles in domestic labour and child-rearing.   
This is because what Mill describes as ‘the nearest approach to social-justice’ is a system of 
decentralised worker-cooperatives in which women take a fully-equal role in the work, co-
ownership, organisation and management.66  But this, of course, means women would be working 
(and probably full-time).  Given that the first ‘horn’ of the trilemma cannot simply have gone away 
(children’s needs would still need to be met), Mill is either endorsing 1+3 (children’s needs being 
met, and women working full-time outside the home, though being exploited) as the closest-
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possible approximation of social justice (in which case Principles simply conflicts with Subjection, and 
we would have to consider which to privilege), or he thinks certain non-normative facts have 
changed, and therefore women’s prima facie duties have also changed.  
 There are two possibilities for how that might happen under the form of socialism Mill is 
endorsing in Principles.  Firstly, men might have taken on (more) equal responsibility for seeing 
domestic labour and child-rearing is done properly (as many socialists who supported workers’ 
cooperatives advocated).  Secondly, we may have restructured the ‘bourgeois’ family (as Mill notes 
we will have to do to properly emancipate women67) and adopted some more-communal form of 
living (as, perhaps, Mill is hinting at in Marriage where he talks of communal family living amongst 
ex-partners and their children and new partners68, or as was endorsed by socialists such as Fourier, 
whose experiments Mill advocated trying out in practice69).  
Of course, a critic might here say that Mill is only trying to ensure that single women would 
enjoy equal rights in worker-cooperatives, but that he still thought on marrying women would take 
on a prima facie responsibility for domestic labour and child-care, which would lay some (moral) 
restrictions on their full-time participation in the workplace.  Given the brevity of Mill’s remarks, 
this is not wholly impossible.  On the other hand, given how key restructuring of the ‘bourgeois’ 
family was both for Mill and for the kinds of socialists of whom he approved70, there are good 
reasons for thinking that Mill was not only thinking of single women.  Moreover, he is, in this 
chapter of Principles, speaking specifically of working-class women, and he evidently already 
thought that married working-class women were more likely than other women to need to go out 
to work as well as do domestic labour.71  So it seems likely married women are included.  And, 
from this, we might also think that when Mill says earlier in the same chapter that he thinks there 
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should be no non-labouring class72, and that he has elsewhere said that domestic labouring and 
child-care is not necessarily a full-time job73 (though doing it counts as labouring), then this would 
necessitate (at least some) married women working outside the home in worker-cooperatives.   
All things considered, then, there seem good grounds for thinking that Mill preferred a 
solution to his trilemma (where the non-ideal circumstances which generated it still held) which 
privileged justice over autonomy, but not that he thought such a solution was, in itself, best-
imaginable or best-feasible – or, even, best-achievable in more than the very short-term.  Clearly, 
he had high hopes for a cooperative-socialist transformation of the economy, and evidently 
thought it not only feasible, but accessible from his own society (as Principles shows74) though he 
seems to have thought that transition to a more-just society through the granting of equal rights 
could be achieved even more swiftly.   
 This reading, then, offers a good defence of Mill against charges of holding less-than-
perfect views on gender-relations and the gendered division of labour because, even in his best-
imaginable world, married women would (at best) face a prima facie responsibility for domestic 
labour (and the other, more-extreme criticisms noted above).  Instead, we can see that Mill is not 
referring to his ideal society in Subjection; and where he does speak of an ideal society, there are 
good reasons for thinking the trilemma he identified in Subjection no longer held, and thus he would 
no longer endorse the arrangement he prefers in Subjection.  
In addition, his conviction that women ought not to be expected to do more labour than 
men; that the domestic labour women do counts as labour in this comparison; and thus his 
preference for options 1+2 rather than 1+3, shows a strong egalitarian element in Mill’s thought.  
This is noteworthy in itself, and is, indeed, something which is often overlooked in Mill 
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scholarship.75  It ought also to go some way to dispelling the thought that his feminism has a solely-
liberal foundation (and thus that any apparent ‘illiberalism’ would undermine it or be self-
contradictory to the point of destroying the argument).  Because of this, it is worth considering 
what forms of egalitarianism are revealed by this new way of looking at Mill’s position in Subjection.  
3.4 Some Thoughts Concerning Mill’s Egalitarianism. 
It is not as odd as it might at first appear to think of egalitarianism in relation to Mill, even though 
he is more famous as a theorist of liberty.  Mill spent a good deal of his life considering egalitarian 
questions of distributive justice from his debates on this topic with Owenites in London in the 
early 1820s, through a series of economic essays in the 1830s and 40s, and seven editions of 
Principles (from 1848 to 1871) to his posthumously published Autobiography and Chapters on Socialism.  
His opinion on what just distributive principles were best-imaginable, best-feasible and best-
accessible clearly changed over time, from his debates against the Owenites and their ideas of equal 
shares in the 1820s76, to his endorsement of Fourierist, Blancian and even Saint-Simonian 
principles of justice in Principles depending on the stage to which society had progressed77, but there 
are good reasons to think there were egalitarian strands (particularly concerning women) even in 
his earliest radical-utilitarianism78.  
 There are two identifiable strands to this egalitarianism which are of relevance here.  That 
is, the idea that people ought to be treated as (moral) equals brings with it certain rights, and it also 
brings with it an obligation to perform certain duties, specifically, to do our fair share within 
society.  (Mill did not prescribe a specific distributive principle which would govern what this ‘fair 
share’ is, partly because he thought some principles, though good in themselves, were in-accessible 
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and even infeasible, and partly because he thought determining what principles of justice we would 
implement politically ought to be a political, and thus democratic, decision made by those who 
were to live under them.79) 
 In his era, women were treated unfairly in both respects.  As regards the first kind of 
equality, women were denied equal political, social, legal and economic rights.  Moreover, they 
were denied the status of ‘persons’ both morally (they were treated paternalistically, at best, and it 
was assumed they are incapable of managing their own affairs as adults) and legally (women were 
denied the legal status of ‘persons’ and (almost) always had ‘guardians’ who made decisions for 
them or owned property etc. on their behalf).  As regards the second, women were also denied the 
opportunity to do their fair share, and thus meet their social obligations of justice.   
 This occurred in two different ways.  Firstly, no women were allowed to perform their fair 
share of political duties, because they were denied the necessary political (and social and legal) 
rights.  Secondly, women were also unable to perform their fair share of other important social 
duties, most obviously regarding socially-necessary labour.  As noted above, for some women 
(particularly in the working-class), this was because they are asked to do too much (all the domestic 
labour/child-rearing and working full-time outside the home).  For other women (particularly in 
the middle- and upper-classes), they are not allowed to do enough.  This is because they are denied 
access to the professions and other areas of the labour-market, and are forced into domestic roles 
by convention and a lack of other viable options.  What is more, many women are also denied the 
ability, to some extent, to contribute ‘morally’, in that their ability to freely develop their own 
individuality, and thereby help maximise not only their own but everyone else’s utility, is curtailed 
by the restrictions they face economically, legally and socially, through gender-norms, and through 
the power of public opinion (which also curtails women’s own imaginative capacities concerning 
what is possible for them).   
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 These two thoughts help explain Mill’s preference for options 1+2 rather than 1+3, as 
outlined above (that is, his preference for women doing their fair share, which means – because 
only they will meet children’s needs, given certain non-normative facts about men – not working 
full time outside the home).  In this case, women are allowed to do their fair share of socially-
necessary labour – but not exploited and asked to do more than their fair share.  As ‘an otherwise 
just state of things’ means that they have been accorded equal political, legal, social and economic 
rights, the first element of his egalitarianism has been met (at-least-formal treatment as equals), 
and this means no women will be denied the opportunity to fulfil their fair share of political duties.  
So, women will be accorded equal rights; and they will perform the duties generated by egalitarian 
principles of justice both politically and socially/economically, without being exploited by being 
asked to do more than their fair share.   
 If, instead, Mill endorsed options 1+3, where women work full-time outside the home and 
also meet children’s needs by performing all the domestic labour, then, although the accordance 
of equal rights would still ensure one element of his egalitarianism was assured, the other would 
not be.  That is, women would be doing more than their fair share.  Of course, as noted above, this 
would mean that their autonomy would be curtailed by a prima facie obligation which unequally 
only falls on women: but their rights would not be unequal.   
As noted above, we might disagree with Mill’s choice – but that is by-the-by.  What it is 
important here to note is that his preference evidently preferences egalitarian concerns over 
concerns of autonomy, and two identifiable strands in his thinking concerning distributive justice 
and the concept of equality help explain this preference: option 1+2, though curtailing autonomy, 
is the fairest option, allowing women to do their fair share, but not forcing them to do more than 
that.  
 These thoughts reveal an important egalitarian foundation to Mill’s feminism.  Evidently, 
he thought that women (as equal persons) had an equal right to maximal liberty consistent with 
the harm-principle.  But this is not his only justification for female emancipation.  Indeed, it is 
because women are equal persons that they deserve equal liberty, and this status as equal persons 
also necessitates a host of other rights, and duties.  And it is one of these duties (to do one’s fair 
share) which places a prima facie obligation on women in Mill’s preferred solution to a trilemma 
which only occurs in specific non-ideal circumstances.  Thus, his solution to the trilemma he 
identifies in Subjection does not undermine his whole argument for female emancipation, because 
both are based primarily on egalitarian concerns, and not (solely) liberal ones. 
3 Re-Assessing Mill’s Position on the Gendered Division of Labour.  
To summarise the previous sections, the criticisms previously mounted against the problematic 
passages in Subjection and Marriage are misplaced, in some cases because they rely on a mis- or 
partial-reading of the passages in question; in others because they unfairly extend a legitimate 
critique of a particular text to Mill’s feminism in general; and in still others because they ignore the 
personal, political and persuasive context of the texts, demanding a radicalism which the text 
cannot be fairly expected to deliver.    
Most importantly, prior criticisms are motivated by the thought that Mill’s ideal thinking 
falls short of really ideal feminism (even for his era).  But a more careful and charitable reading of 
the passages in question show that they contain a nuanced and sophisticated consideration of 
competing claims of justice within a specific set of non-ideal circumstances, and the most-
preferable solution to a trilemma facing women in such circumstances.  If we wish to glimpse what 
Mill actually thought might represent ideal relations between the genders, and a properly-just 
division of labour (domestic and non-domestic), we should look beyond Subjection and Marriage, to 
Principles and the Autobiography.  Thus, his position in Subjection and Marriage is much less liable to 
the criticisms previously mounted against it, and his ideal position is equally immune.   
This said, Mill may still be liable for criticism for, in non-ideal circumstances, advocating 
fairness over autonomy in his solution to the trilemma he identifies as facing women in a world 
where children’s needs must be met, and men refuse to take a fair share of child-rearing and 
domestic labour.  But this is true only if one does not share Mill’s view of the relative importance 
of justice and autonomy.   
Mill may also be liable for criticism for not directly tackling the question of men’s role in 
child-rearing and domestic labour, and openly campaigning for a more equal sharing of domestic 
duties, therefore ensuring the trilemma identified in Subjection did not arise (or was not long-lived).  
However, we ought to be wary of criticising Mill for not doing that in Subjection.   
Lastly, we might think Mill underestimates the potential there would still be for domination 
and for women to be vulnerable to unequal power-relations, even when they have the power to 
earn an independent living (particularly those associated with working part-time, which generally 
means working in less-well-remunerated, less-prestigious, less-well-regulated jobs) – though this 
need not be true of a part-time work in a more cooperative, socialist future, and particularly one 
in which women splitting their labour between domestic and non-domestic labour would be seen 
as working full-time, not part-time.  These criticisms, however pertinent, are also importantly 
different to those which have been launched against Mill in the past, and from which he can be 
defended.  
Moreover, this way of reading Mill reveals if not another line of defence, certainly a set of 
things to be noted about his feminism.  Even if there are some criticisms to which it is liable, there 
are a number of radical elements which are often-overlooked, and which ought, actually, to be 
celebrated.  Others have recognised the radicalism of Mill’s analysis of the social construction of 
gender, and of the way in which this is affected by patriarchal power-structures.80  But we ought 
also to recognise the radical way in which Mill interrogates the public/private distinction with his 
recognition that all people ought to do their fair share of labour, and that domestic labour counts 
as ‘real’ labour in this calculation.  That is, Mill does not think that domestic labour is a different 
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‘value’ or ‘sort’ of labour – it is labour, just like any labour men do outside the home.  Indeed, 
when it comes to early-years education in particular, it is socially-vital labour (in a way which much 
male labour might not be, especially if it is ‘unproductive’81).   
Similarly, Mill evidently does not think the economy occurs in a totally separate space, free 
from considerations of where labourers come from and how they are created and sustained, and 
ignoring the huge amount of unwaged labour which women do in order to allow ‘homo-
economicus’ to participate in the labour-market.  Instead, he thinks this currently-unwaged work 
really is work, and though he does not recommend paying women to do it, he does think that the 
wage their husbands receive ought to be enough to remunerate women’s work as well.  Of course, 
we might criticise Mill for that, thinking it would be better if women earned their own money, 
either outside the home, or through payments for the domestic labour they do inside their own 
homes.82  But it is worth recalling that Mill does not think that men ought to retain control of the 
household income, doling out some ‘pin-money’ to their wives, but retaining all the power.  
Instead, he speaks of women managing the household budget, which would involve control over 
the earnings and how they are spent.  Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere83, he views marriage 
as a cooperative enterprise, where earnings and wealth are distributed according to a principle of 
justice determined by the (equal) members.  The money earned by a husband would, therefore, 
not simply be ‘his’, but ‘theirs’, and both partners would have an equal say in what principles of 
justice ought to govern its distribution.  Clearly, we might have a concern that women would be 
placed at a disadvantage even in such a cooperative marriage in terms of their bargaining position, 
Mill’s insistence that marriage really would be a free choice; that women would have a variety of 
other options and thus always retain the power to earn their own income even if they did not do 
so outside the home; and that each party in the marriage ought to be mutually dependent on the 
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other for happiness, affection, love and support notwithstanding.84  Still, his recognition that what 
happens in the ‘private’ sphere not only has important effects on the public sphere (and particularly 
the market), but is a necessary condition of men’s participation in the public sphere, is also a radical 
insight, and he ought to be recognised as making it.  Both of these claims also highlight that Mill 
thought the family was somewhere that principles of justice applied: this, too, is a radical claim.   
His feminism, therefore, might not be immune from any criticism – but it is evident that, 
whatever he did think about domestic labour and gender-relations in ideal circumstances, Mill did 
not think it for the best that women are solely ‘good housekeepers’ in an ideal world.  What he 
says in Subjection applies only a specific set of non-ideal circumstances.  His views of best-feasible 
and best-imaginable gender-relations and the division of labour are harder to discern, but can be 
glimpsed in Principles and the Autobiography where he endorses a socialist future which would 
involve much more equal gender-relations, and a radical re-imagination of the family.85  His 
feminism, therefore, is much more complex, radical, and defendable than is often supposed.  
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